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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN M. JOHNS, l 
Petitioner/Appellant, i 
-VS- i 
KENNETH SHULSEN, Warden i 
of the Utah State Prison, 
et al., i 
Case No. 870349-CA 
t Priority No. 3 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The petitioner below has now sought review of an order 
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Honorable David S. Young, Judge, dismissing his Petition for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Hereafter the appellant shall be referred 
to as the "prisoner" and the respondent shall be referred to as 
the "warden." 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-2(f) (1987) to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The prisoner has presented only one issue in his 
docketing statement, namely whether the Court below erred in 
holding that the prisoner could have and should have raised the 
issue of a speedy revocation hearing in prior proceedings and 
therefore was now precluded from doing so. In his brief, the 
prisoner lists two additional issues: (1) error in the use of 
allegedly false factual information; and (2) error by the Appeals 
Court in denying his motion for provision of a transcript, and he 
alludes to various other issues in the rather disjointed text of 
the brief. Only the first issue is properly before the Court and 
will be extensively discussed here, but it is dispositive of the 
other issues. This issue is fundamentally that of whether the 
prisoner, having previously litigated the legality of his 
confinement, and having had the opportunity to raise the issue of 
a lack of a speedy revocation hearing (and other issues) but 
having failed to do so, can do so in a subsequent action. The 
warden, as respondent for the State in this matter, takes the 
position that the prisoner is barred from pursuing these claims 
by the doctrine of res judicata. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This matter does not turn on the interpretation of 
particular statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This habeas corpus action is part of a succession of 
actions brought by the prisoner testing his confinement at the 
Utah State Prison. This particular petition was filed in October 
of 1986 in the Third District Court and was dismissed by the 
Honorable David S. Young on June 22, 1987. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prisoner was paroled from the Utah State Prison on 
June 8f 1982, after serving approximately three and one-half 
years of an indeterminate sentence for aggravated sexual assault 
and aggravated kidnapping. About six weeks later he was arrested 
by Adult Probation and Parole agents and charged with aggravated 
sexual assault, two counts of sodomy, and possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. At a criminal trial in 
October of 1982, the prisoner was acquitted on the weapons charge 
but the jury could not reach a verdict on the other charges. In 
November, he was retried on the three remaining charges and 
acquitted. In December 1982, Adult Probation and Parole charged 
Johns with violating the conditions of his parole, based upon 
allegations of the conduct for which he had been tried and 
acquitted in October and November. A formal revocation hearing 
was held before the Board of Pardons on February 5, 1983. The 
prisoner was represented by counsel and was permitted to present 
evidence and call witnesses on his own behalf. At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Board of Pardons found that Johns had 
violated the conditions of his parole by having committed the 
offenses of aggravated sexual assault, sodomy, and possession of 
alcohol, and he was retained in custody. 
Two years later, in February of 1985, the prisoner 
sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging numerous errors and the 
denial of several constitutional rights. A hearing was conducted 
on April 5, 1985, before the District Court for the Third 
Judicial District, Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge. The 
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parties separately briefed the issue of whether an acquittal in a 
criminal prosecution precludes a subsequent parole revocation 
proceeding based upon the same offenses. The trial court 
rejected all of Johns' claims. This matter was then appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court which on April 21, 1986, affirmed the 
trial court in all respects. Johns v. Shulsenf 717 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1986). 
After losing the appeal in the Supreme Court the 
prisoner filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, but that petition 
was dismissed by the Magistrate on August 29, 1986, and no 
objections were filed to the Magistrate's Report and 
Recommendation. 
In October of 1986, the prisoner then filed this 
successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third 
District Court. This petition was twice amended and eventually 
dismissed, after briefing and argument, by the Honorable David S. 
Young, on June 22, 1987. The present appeal arises from this 
dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's position is simply that matters which could 
have been and should have been asserted in prior habeas corpus 
proceedings are not cognizable in a subsequent proceeding. This 
is supported by the fundamental notions of res judicata as well 
as by the basic principle of judicial economy in the avoidance of 
piecemeal litigation of habeas corpus claims. 
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ARGUMENT 
The prisoner's fundamental argument in this action 
seems to be that he was deprived of constitutional rights in the 
denial of a "speedy" revocation hearing after his July, 1982, 
arrest and after his acquittal on certain felony charges in 
October and November, 1982. (The revocation hearing was held in 
February of 1983.) He argues that the District Court erred in 
ruling that he could have and should have raised the issue in 
prior litigation and therefore is barred from doing so. 
In his brief, the prisoner asserts among other things, 
that he did in fact raise this issue previously. If it is in 
fact true that he has repeatedly raised the issue in the past, 
then it is even more clear that he cannot relitigate the issue in 
this proceeding, and the following argument applies even more 
strongly to his case. 
However, the State's argument will follow on the theory 
that this (speedy revocation hearing) is an issue which could 
have and should have been raised in prior proceedings, because 
that appears to have been the understanding of the District 
Court. 
POINT I 
THE PRISONER HAS NO RIGHT TO PRESENT NEW 
HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION 
WHEN THOSE CLAIMS COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN RAISED IN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. 
It is well established in habeas corpus litigation that 
petitions which contain grounds for relief which could have been 
and should have been asserted in a prior petition are not 
cognizable in a subsequent proceeding. The prisoner is simply 
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precluded, after ample opportunity, from repeatedly seeking state 
remedies on state procedural grounds. Craig v. Sheriff, Washoe 
County, 557 P.2d 710 (Nev. 1976). Strict enforcement of this 
principle is important to promote judicial economy and further 
the salutary purpose of eliminating piecemeal litigation of 
habeas corpus claims. Diomiack v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 
630 P.2d 751 (Nev. 1981) and Karr v. Page, 437 P.2d 458 (Okla. 
Ct. App. 1968). 
The prisoner alludes to two Utah cases which suggest 
that such procedural default rules may be waived in "unusual 
circumstances" but he does not attempt to spell out in any way 
how his situation may fit within the narrow confines of these 
exceptions. Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983), and Emig 
v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985). In Andrews, a death 
penalty case, petitioner was allowed to go forward because the 
legal basis for certain claims, which had been raised at least 
indirectly in a prior application, had not been originally 
available but arguably through a change in law, now was 
available. In Emig, the Supreme Court merely recognized the 
petitioner's ability to file an original habeas corpus petition 
to review his pre-warrant detention in an extradition proceeding. 
There was no issue of successive petitions involved. 
The state does not contend here that, where there is no 
direct judicial appeal available from an administrative* 
proceeding, such as a Board of Pardons hearing, the aggrieved 
person (prisoner) is totally precluded from filing a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus. Rather, such a petition, if filed, must 
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include all of the claims which are legally available to the 
petitioner at that time. In the present case, the prisoner had a 
full and fair opportunity to present all of his claims to the 
district court on his first application for a writ, and yet for 
whatever reason, did not do so. By his failure, prisoner has 
waived his right to litigate any further habeas corpus claims in 
this proceeding, and this action was properly dismissed by Judge 
Young. 
POINT II 
THE PRISONER'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BT THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to 
protect litigants from the burden of having to relitigate issues 
with the same party and thus to promote judicial economy by 
preventing needless litigation. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-329 
(1971). 
One branch of the doctrine of res judicata, claim 
preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims that previously have 
been fully litigated between the same parties. Church v. Meadow 
Springs Ranch Corp.# 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983); International 
Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979); Krofcheck v. 
Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1974). To invoke this 
branch of res judicata, both actions must involve the same 
parties or their privies and the same claim or cause of action. 
Furthermore, the first claim must have been litigated on the 
merits and must have resulted in a final judgment. Copper State 
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Thrift and Loan v, Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987); 
Penrod, supra, at 874-75. 
The Court should refer to the reported decision in the 
previous case involving this prisoner and the then-warden of the 
Utah State Prison, Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1986). 
In that case the prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus on facts 
arising out of the same course of incarceration and the same 
proceedings as in the present action. All of the issues raised 
here either were raised then or could have been raised in that 
action. If they could have been raised and were not, they should 
have been. 
The combination of this prior-cited case with the 
present petition and appeal brings this matter within the 
requirements to invoke claim preclusion under the doctrine of res 
judicata. The prior petition and the present action were both 
brought by the prisoner, Steven M. Johns, and both named the 
warden of the State Prison as respondent. Both petitions are 
based on the same claims and causes of action. There was 
judgment on the merits in the previous action and the petition 
for a writ was denied; on appeal, judgment of the trial court was 
affirmed. 
Under the claim preclusion branch of the res judicata 
doctrine, since the parties have had an opportunity to present 
their case, the prior judgment is binding both as to those issues 
actually tried and those which could and should have been raised 
in the prior proceeding. Copper State Thrift, supra, at 389; 
Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah, 1974). Where 
-8-
res judicata is applicable, the prior judgment is conclusive upon 
the parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of the same 
issues. Penrod, supraf at 875; Olsen v. Bd. of Ed. of Granite 
School District, 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1977). This is true 
even with respect to additional items raised as factual matters 
by the prisoner in his brief on appeal because these issues could 
have and should have been raised in the previous proceeding and 
the prisoner has shown no type of unusual circumstance which 
would have precluded him from doing so. Otherwise the concept of 
res judicata becomes meaningless and the courts are subjected to 
endless litigation rehashing old issues with merely new arguments 
being asserted. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons enunciated in the foregoing the 
warden respectfully requests that the Court affirm the dismissal 
of the petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ C T K day of February, 
1989. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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